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Moral hazard and the financial crisis of 2007-9: An Explanation for 
why the subprime mortgage defaults and the housing market 
collapse produced a financial crisis that was more severe than any 




This paper examines the financial crisis in 2007-9 that was more severe 
than previous crashes, including the dot-com crash of 2001 and the market 
crash of 1987 (with the exception of the Great Depression of 1929). This 
severity was due to excessively risky speculative bets taken by the 
executives of financial institutions. When the ‘housing bubble’ burst, these 
speculative bets, which were based on the U.S. housing market and the 
subprime mortgages, triggered the financial systemic failures of the U.S. in 
June 2007 (the subprime mortgage crisis) and September 2008 (the 
shadow-banking crisis). The systemic financial failure of September 2008 
(the shadow-banking crisis) was greatly amplified by excessively risky 
speculations and this led to a rapid deterioration of the entire global 
economy. This paper examines the potential for moral hazard in the 
financial system leading up to this crisis, and attempts to determine if this 
was a motivating factor in these risky bets. 
 
Keywords: moral hazard, financial crisis of 2007-9, burst of the housing 
bubble, subprime mortgages crisis, shadow-banking crisis 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper explains that the excessively risky bets taken by the 
executives of financial institutions were possibly motivated by moral hazard. 
It shows that these risky bets, in the context of the integration of global 
financial markets, meant that subprime mortgage defaults and the housing 
market collapse produced a financial crisis in 2007-9 that was much more 
severe than previous crashes, including the dot-com crash of 2001 and the 
market crash of 1987 (with the exception of the Great Depression of 1929). 
Speculative bets based on the U.S. housing market and subprime 
mortgages triggered the U.S. financial systemic failures of June 2007 
(subprime mortgage crisis) and September 2008 (shadow-banking crisis). 
The systemic financial failure of September 2008 (shadow-banking crisis) 
was greatly amplified by these excessively risky speculations, and this led 
to a rapid deterioration of the entire global economy. 
 
Determining if risk-taking was induced by moral hazard 
Many authors, including Wolf (2008), Elliott & Atkinson (2009), 
Krugman (2009) and the editors of The Economist (2009, July 16) have 
written that the systemic financial failures that occurred in the U.S. were 
the consequence of excessive risky bets taken by the executives of financial 
institution. This reckless risk-taking was possibly induced by ‘moral hazard’ 
(Acharya et al. 2009; Cooper 2008; Leopold 2009). Leopold (2009, p. 48) 
has identified that the term moral hazard, borrowed from the insurance 
industry, describes a troublesome financial innovation: 
If I have full insurance on my bicycle, I might not lock it up properly 
since it’s not such a big deal (to me) if it’s stolen – the insurance 
company will replace it. So, at least in theory, more insurance could 
lead to lazier bicycle riders – a moral hazard – who enable more 
bicycle thefts. In finance the bicycle is risk. If I know I will be bailed 
out if I assume risk and fail, I’ll assume more and more risk and let 
you bail me out if I fail. 
 6 
    
 
In the context of this description, two factors can be identified that may 
have encouraged executives of financial institutions to take excessively 
risky bets: 
1.  The compensation system of executives within the financial 
system is skewed toward moral hazard. These executives often 
receive basic fixed salaries, and large cash bonuses tied to short-
term profits. These bonuses are positive in times of success, and 
at almost zero when returns are poor. This creates a perverse 
incentive to take-on risks: winning on a risky bet results in large 
cash bonuses, while losing does not result in loss; the cost of this 
risky bet is not carried by the executives, it is carried by the 
shareholders. In most cases, one year’s winning bet is enough to 
guarantee a safe retirement. In this context, economic 
performance of the financial institution throughout the next year 
and beyond becomes of lesser concern to the individual. 
This is the classic principal agent problem (also known as agency 
theory) with asymmetric information in favor of the agent. The 
principals (shareholders) of financial institutions demand profits 
and provide large bonuses as incentives to motivate their agents 
(the executives of the financial institution) to obtain these. The 
asymmetry of information lies in the lack of knowledge, form the 
principals, of the consequences of the risks that these agents take 
to earn their bonuses. 
 
2.  The explicit and implicit government guarantees across the 
financial system lead to a lack of effective market supervision of 
possible moral hazard.  These guarantees remove the need for 
depositors to evaluate the health of commercial banks, for debt 
holders to look at the soundness of government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs), and for investors to analyze the risk of ‘too 
big to fail’ financial institutions. Additionally, because of the 
government guaranty function these institutions have access to 
low cost debt. This easily obtained money is a tempting incentive 7 
    
for the executives of these institutions to leverage their bets, and 
so take greater risks to generate increased profits and gain 
substantial bonuses. 
 
The excessive risk taken by the executives of financial institutions, 
possibly induced by moral hazard, was reinforced by an article written in the 
The New York Times (Krugman, 2009, March 1) that commented on a 
speech given by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke four years prior: 
Bernake cited “the depth and sophistication of the country’s 
financial markets (which, among other things, have allowed 
households easy access to housing wealth).” Depth, yes. But 
sophistication? Well, you could say that American bankers, 
empowered by a quarter-century of deregulatory zeal, led the world 
in finding sophisticated ways to enrich themselves by hiding risk 
and fooling investors. 
 
The magazine The Economist (2009, July 16), in an article with the 
suggestive title of Going overboard: are investment banks run for 
employees or shareholders?, used the Lehman Brothers bank as an example 
of the kind of moral hazard that precipitates a financial crisis. This bank 
made losses in the two quarters before it collapsed September 14, 2008, 
and yet continued to accrue a compensation pot for its employees not far 
off the levels of 2007 (see Figure 1). The Economist (2009, July 16) 
explained this with the saying, “heads we win, tails you lose ”.  
 
Figure 1. Leman Brothers: an example of moral hazard 8 
  
 
Source: The Economist (2009, July 16) 
<http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14034875 
 
Furthermore, returns to shareholders over the entire cycle worsen 
when the failures of the bank are included. Lehman paid out $55 billion to 
employees in the decade up to the end of 2008. Shareholders earned 
cumulative profits of zero, as well as the loss of all of their capital when the 
firm failed. 
In retrospect, with the integration of global financial markets, the 
availability of cheap money, and the incentive for risk-taking, the stage was 
set for the substantial financial crisis that was triggered by the burst of the 
housing bubble. 
 
The systemic financial failures in the U.S. during 2007 and 2008 
Acharya et al. (2009, p. 2) have given a compact explanation of the 
systemic failures in the U.S. that precipitated the financial crisis: 
The financial crisis was triggered in the first quarter of 2006 when 
the housing market turned. A number of the mortgages designed 
for a subset of the market, namely subprime mortgages, were 
designed with a balloon interest payment, implying that the 
 9 
    
mortgage would be refinanced within a short period to avoid the 
jump in the mortgage rate. The mortgage refinancing presupposed 
that home prices would continue to appreciate. Thus, the collapse in 
the housing market necessarily meant a wave of future defaults in 
the subprime area – a systemic event was coming… 
While subprime defaults were the root cause, the most identifiable 
event that led to systemic failure was most likely the collapse on 
June 20, 2007, of the highly levered Bear Stearns-managed hedge 
funds that invested in subprime asset-backed securities (ABSs). In 
particular, as the prices of the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
began to fall with the defaults of the subprime mortgages, lenders 
to the funds demanded more collateral. 
The event discussed in this extract illustrates the features of a typical 
financial crisis: a credit boom, which leads to leveraging of financial 
institutions (in this case, the Bear Sterns hedge funds); and an asset 
bubble, which increases the probability of a large price shock (in this case, 
the housing market). Eventually, when shocks led to a bursting of the asset 
bubble (that is, a fall in housing prices) and trigger a process of 
deleveraging, these unsustainable asset bubbles and credit booms collapse, 
with the following three consequences: 
1.  The fall in value of the asset, backed by high leverage, leads to 
margin calls that force borrowers to sell the asset, which in turn 
starts to deflate in value. 
2.  This fall in the asset value then reduces the value of the 
collateral backing the initial leveraged credit boom. 
3.  Margin calls, and the forced fire sale of the assets, then drive 
down its price even below its now lower fundamental value, 
creating a cascading vicious circle of falling asset prices, margin 
calls, deleveraging, and further asset price deflation. 
 While the subprime defaults were identified as the root cause, the 
event that most conspicuously led to the first systemic failure was the 
collapse (on June 20, 2007) of two highly leveraged Bear Stearns-managed 
hedge funds, which had invested in subprime asset-backed securities 
(ABSs).  10 
    
This problem with the Bearn Sterns-managed hedge funds motivated a 
complete revaluation of all credit instruments. Acharya et al. (2009, p. 3) 
have identified a consequence of this as being the widening of credit 
spreads on investment grade bonds, high-yield bonds, leverage loans via 
the LCDX index (based on 100 equally weighted loan credit default swaps 
referencing syndicated first-line loans), collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) backed by commercial mortgages via the CMBX index (based on 25 
commercial mortgage-backed securities), and CDOs backed by subprime 
mortgages via the ABX index (based on tranches of 20 subprime mortgage 
pools). 
As subprime mortgages defaulted, the pricing of structured credit 
instruments was called into question, particularly as the new, exotic and 
illiquid financial instruments were difficult to value (the same was true for 
complex derivative instruments). Another complication was that many of 
these instruments traded over-the-counter rather than on an exchange, and 
investors discovered that there was little information and disclosure about 
such instruments and who was holding them. Many of the new financial 
institutions (such as hedge funds, private equity, structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs)) were opaque, having little or no regulation.  
Private financial markets cannot function properly without 
transparency for market participants and regulators, as when investors 
cannot price complex new securities, they cannot properly assess the 
overall losses faced by financial institutions; and when they cannot know 
who is holding the risk for the so-called toxic waste, this results in 
generalized uncertainty. In this instance, this scenario led to lack of trust 
and confidence between the financial institutions, which in turn resulted in 
the freezing of the market. 
The consequence of market freeze was, over several months, a series 
of subprime lender bankruptcies, massive write-downs by financial 
institutions (culminating in the rescue of Bearn Sterns, the fifth-largest 
investment bank), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) decision to 
place two government-sponsored enterprises (the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 11 
    
Corporation (Freddie Mac)) into conservatorship, and the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers (the fourth-largest investment bank) in 2008. The run on 
Bear Sterns started in the week of March 10, 2008. During the following 
weekend the government engineered a rescue package for its purchase by 
JPMorgan Chase. The FHFA assumed conservatorship of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac on September 7, 2008 and Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy over the weekend following Friday, September 12, 2008. 
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (during the weekend of September 
14, 2008), revealed to the market that there were no financial institutions 
that were ‘too big to fail’, and precipitated the second systemic failure. The 
consequence was a run on other institutions, leading to the announcement 
by the Bank of America during the same weekend (September 14, 2008), 
that it was negotiating to acquire Merrill Lynch (the third-largest investment 
bank). Collateral calls on American International Group (AIG) led to its 
government bailout on Monday, September 15, 2008. Without this bailout, 
its exposure to the financial sector (from insuring of some $500 billion 
worth of currency default swaps CDS on AAA-rated CDOs) would have 
caused immediate (and potentially catastrophic) losses to a number of 
firms. The two remaining large investment banks, Morgan Stanley (the 
second-largest investment bank) and Goldman Sachs (the largest 
investment bank) received the official approval for transition from 
investment banks to bank holding companies (BHCs) on September 21, 
2008, which allowed them to receive extensive low-cost loans from the 
Federal Reserve Bank. 
 
The shadow-banking crisis 
Krugman (2009, p. 170) has described the financial crisis of 2007-
2009 as a ‘non-bank banking crisis’. To clarify this, he quoted a speech 
given in June of 2008 by the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, Timothy Geithner (Krugman, 2009, p. 161): 
 
The structure of the financial system changed fundamentally during 
the boom, with dramatic growth in the shares of assets outside the 12 
    
traditional banking structure. This non-bank financial system grew 
to be very large, particularly in money and funding markets. In 
early 2007, asset-backed commercial paper conduits, in structured 
investment vehicles, in auction rate preferred securities, tender 
option bonds and variable rate demand notes, had a combined 
asset size of roughly $2.2 trillion. Assets financed overnight in 
tripartite repo grew to $2.5 trillion. Assets help in hedge funds grew 
to roughly $1.8 trillion. The combined balance sheets of the then 
five major investment banks totaled $4 trillion. 
In comparison, the total assets of the top five bank holding 
companies in the United States at that point were just over $6 
trillion, and total assets of the entire banking system were about 
$10 trillion… 
The scale of long-term risky and relatively illiquid assets financed by 
very short-term liabilities made many of the vehicles and 
institutions in this parallel financial system vulnerable to a classic 
type of run, but without the protections such as deposit insurances 
that banking system has in place to reduce risk. 
 
Krugman (2009, p. 163-164) has further identified the presence of 
what he has described as malign neglect, which may have been the cause 
of the shadow-banking crisis: 
As the shadow-banking system expanded to rival or even surpass 
conventional banking in importance, politicians and government 
officials should have realized that we were re-creating the kind of 
financial vulnerability that made the Great Depression possible – 
and they should have responded by extending regulations and 
financial safety net to cover these new institutions… 
In fact, the Long Term Capital Management crisis should have 
served as an object lesson of the dangers posed by the shadow-
banking system. Certainly many people were aware of just how 
close the system had come to collapse. 
Although the majority of the non-banking institutions in the shadow-
banking sector resembled banks, they did not have access to the safety 
nets that were enjoyed by banks until 2008. These safety nets (deposit 
insurance, the lender of last resort (LOLR) and the central bank) had been 13 
    
created to especially prevent runs on banks and protect depositors. The 
subprime crisis initiated a run on these non-bank institutions that resulted 
in the demise of a significant number of them. This began in early 2007 
with the collapse of several hundred of the non-bank mortgage lenders, 
which was followed by the collapse of the entire system of structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs) that had invested in CDOs and were based on 
mortgages and other credit derivatives, as well as the demise of the major 
independent broker-dealers in the U.S.  
Bern Stearns was the first to experience a run on their liabilities. This 
forced them to unravel the repo financing that was the basis of their 
leveraged operations. Following this was the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, the sale of Merrill Lynch to the Bank of America, and the 
transformation of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs into bank holding 
companies. The demise of the shadow-banking system continued with the 
run on money market funds, hedge funds and private equity funds. 
 
Reasons for the rapid decline in the global economy in 2008 
In 2008, as a consequence of the U.S. systemic financial failures, the 
global economy entered into a severe financial crisis.  The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) (2009, p. 2-5) 
explained that a dramatic escalation of the financial crisis in September 
2008 provoked an unprecedented contraction of activity and trade, despite 
policy efforts: 
In the year following the outbreak of the U.S. subprime crisis in 
August 2007, the global economy bent but did not buckle. Activity 
slowed in the face of tightening credit conditions, with advanced 
economies falling into mild recessions by the middle quarters of 
2008, but with emerging and developing economies continuing to 
grow at fairly robust rates by past standards. However, financial 
wounds continued to fester, despite policymakers’ efforts to sustain 
market liquidity and capitalization, as concerns about losses from 
bad assets increasingly raised questions about the solvency and 
funding of core financial institutions. The situation deteriorated 
rapidly after the dramatic blowout of the financial crisis in 14 
    
September 2008, following the default by a large U.S. investment 
bank (Lehman Brothers), the rescue of the largest U.S. insurance 
company (American International Group, AIG), and intervention in a 
range of other systemic institutions in the United States and 
Europe. 
These events prompted a huge increase in perceived counterparty risk, 
as banks faced large write-downs, the solvency of many of the most 
established financial institutions came into question, the demand for 
liquidity escalated to new heights, and market volatility surged once more. 
The result was a flight to quality that depressed yields on the most liquid 
government securities and an evaporation of wholesale funding that 
prompted a disorderly deleveraging (which then spread across the rest of 
the global financial system). Liquid assets were sold at dramatically reduced 
prices, and credit lines to hedge funds and other leveraged financial 
intermediaries in the shadow-banking system were slashed. High-grade as 
well as high-yield corporate bond spreads widened sharply, the flow of trade 
finance and working capital was heavily disrupted, banks tightened lending 
standards further, and equity prices fell steeply. 
Emerging markets, which had previously been sheltered from financial 
strain by their limited exposure to the U.S. subprime market, were strongly 
impacted by these events. The issuing of new securities came to a virtual 
stop, bank related flows were curtailed, bond spreads soared, equity prices 
dropped, and exchange markets came under heavy pressure. Beyond a 
general rise in risk aversion, capital flows were curtailed by a range of 
adverse factors. These included the damage to banks (especially in Western 
Europe) and hedge funds (which had previously been major conduits), the 
growing desire to move funds under the ‘umbrella’ offered by the increasing 
provision of guarantees in mature markets, and rising concerns about 
national economic prospects (particularly in economies that previously had 
relied extensively on external financing). Adding to these strains, the 
turbulence exposed internal vulnerabilities within many emerging 
economies, bringing attention to currency mismatches on borrower balance 
sheets, weak risk management (for example, substantial corporate losses 15 
    
on currency derivatives markets in some countries), and excessively rapid 
bank credit growth. 
Although a complete global economic meltdown was averted, this 
sharp escalation of financial stress through a range of channels had strong 
impacts on the global economy. The credit crunch, generated by 
deleveraging pressures and a breakdown of securitization technology, hurt 
even the most highly-rated private borrowers. Sharp falls in equity markets, 
as well as the continuing deflation of housing bubbles have led to a massive 
loss of household wealth. In part, these developments can be considered to 
be inevitable adjustments, necessary to correct past excesses and 
technological failures akin to those that triggered the bursting of the dot-
com bubble. However, because the excesses and failures were at the core 
of the banking system, the ramifications have been quickly transmitted to 
all sectors and countries of the global economy. Moreover, the scale of the 
blows has been greatly magnified by the collapse of business and consumer 
confidence in the face of rising doubts about economic prospects and 
continuing uncertainty about policy responses. The rapidly deteriorating 
economic outlook has further accentuated financial strains, producing a 
global feedback loop that has undermined policymakers’ efforts to remedy 
the situation. 
Thus, the impact on financial activity was experienced quickly and 
throughout a wide area. Industrial production and merchandise trade 
plummeted in the fourth quarter of 2008, and continued to fall rapidly in 
early 2009 across both advanced and emerging economies. As purchases of 
investment goods and consumer durables (such as autos and electronics) 
were impacted by credit disruptions and rising anxiety, inventories began to 
rapidly build-up. Recent data provide some tentative indications that the 
rate of contraction may now be starting to moderate. Business confidence 
has picked up modestly, and there are signs that consumer purchases are 
stabilizing, helped by the cushion provided by falling commodity prices and 
anticipation of macroeconomic policy support (Summers, 2009, July 17). 
However, employment continues to drop rapidly, particularly in the U.S. 16 
    
Overall, the global GDP is estimated to have contracted by an alarming 
6¼ percent (annualized) in the fourth quarter of 2008 (a swing from 4 
percent growth one year earlier), and to have fallen almost as fast in the 
first quarter of 2009. All economies around the world have been seriously 
affected, although the direction of the impact has varied. The advanced 
economies had experienced an unprecedented 7½ percent decline in the 
fourth quarter of 2008, and most are now suffering deep recessions. While 
the U.S. economy in particular may have suffered from intensified financial 
strain and the continued fall in the housing sector, Western Europe and 
advanced Asia have also been strongly affected by the collapse in trade as 
well as rising financial problems of their own and housing corrections in 
some national markets. 
Emerging economies contracted 4 percent in the fourth quarter in the 
aggregate, due to damage inflicted through both financial and trade 
channels. Activity in East Asian economies, which have a heavy reliance on 
manufacturing exports, has fallen sharply, although the downturns in China 
and India have been somewhat muted, given the lower shares of their 
export sectors in domestic production and their more resilient domestic 
demand. Emerging Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine) have 
also been greatly impacted due to their heavy dependence on external 
financing as well as on manufacturing exports and (for the CIS) commodity 
exports. Countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East have 
suffered from plummeting commodity prices, financial strains and a weak 
export demand. 
Inflation pressures have subsided concurrently with the rapid reduction 
in global activity. Commodity prices fell sharply from mid-year highs, 
undercut by the weakening prospects for the emerging economies, which 
have provided the bulk of demand growth in recent years. At the same 
time, economic slack has contained wage increases and eroded profit 
margins. As a result, the twelve month headline inflation fell below 1 
percent in the advanced economies during February 2009, although core 
inflation remained in the 1½–2 percent range, with the notable exception of 17 
    
Japan. Inflation has also moderated significantly across the emerging 
economies, although in some cases falling exchange rates have moderated 
the downward momentum. 
Side effects of the financial crisis have included an increased 
conservatism and rising home bias. Gross global capital flows contracted 
sharply in the fourth quarter of 2008. In net terms, flows have favored 
countries with the markets that are most liquid and that have the safest 
government securities; thus net private flows to emerging and developing 
economies have almost entirely collapsed. These shifts have affected the 
world’s major currencies. Since September 2008, the euro, U.S. dollar, and 
yen have appreciated notably. The Chinese renminbi and other currencies 
reliant on the dollar (including those in the Middle East) have also 
appreciated in real effective terms. Most other emerging economy 
currencies have weakened sharply, despite support for them from the use of 
international reserves. 
According to the IMF (2009, p. 2), the dramatic escalation of the 
financial crisis in September 2008 was caused by the subprime crisis of 
August 2007. However, this only became catastrophic when the extent of 
the aggressive borrowing (leveraging) by financial institutions to speculate 
with these risky ABSs became known, as this threw the solvency and 
funding of these institutions into question. From this moment on, the 
situation deteriorated rapidly, and this culminated in September 2008 with 
the run on large non-banking financial institutions, which were more 
exposed to this risk. This indicates that two distinctive forces that could 
have been motivated by moral hazard: the subprime mortgages and the 
non-banking (or shadow-banking) speculation.  
There is also a third force that has contributed to the financial crisis: 
namely, the complete blindness of the economists to foresee the burst of 
the housing bubble and the consequences of wild speculation going on in 
the financial market. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Krugman in his articles “School of scoundrels” (2009, August 2) and “How 
did economists get it so wrong?” (2009, September 5), and The Economist 
in the articles “The other-worldly philosophers” (2009, July 16) and “What 18 
    
went wrong with economics” (2009, July 16) have identified some of the 
important reasons for this blindness. The Economist (2009, July 16) has 
published one of the most dramatic statements on economists of this time: 
Robert Lucas, one of the greatest macroeconomists of his 
generation, and his followers are “making ancient and basic 
analytical errors all over the place”. Harvard’s Robert Barro, another 
towering figure in the discipline, is “making truly boneheaded 
arguments”. The past 30 years of macroeconomics training at 
American and British universities were a “costly waste of time”. 
To the uninitiated, economics has always been a dismal science. But 
all these attacks come from within the guild: from Brad DeLong of 
the University of California, Berkeley; Paul Krugman of Princeton 
and the New York Times; and Willem Buiter of the London School of 
Economics (LSE), respectively. The macroeconomic crisis of the 
past two years is also provoking a crisis of confidence in 
macroeconomics. In the last of his Lionel Robbins lectures at the 
LSE on June 10th, Mr Krugman feared that most macroeconomics of 
the past 30 years was “spectacularly useless at best, and positively 
harmful at worst”. 
 
Moral hazard and subprime mortgages 
Most economists agree that the fundamental cause of the financial 
crisis of 2007-9 was global imbalance (primarily, the huge current-account 
deficit of the U.S., and China’s huge surplus), which promoted the 
combination of a credit boom and a housing bubble in the U.S. After the 
dot-com bust of 2001, investors had become cautious and investment 
spending was weak. Faced with strong external demand for AAA-rated 
assets, the non-bank financial system used a creative solution. Marginal 
home loans (the subprime mortgages) were packaged into ostensibly safe 
securities (The Economist, 2009, January 24). These mortgage backed 
securities (MBS) derived their value from mortgage payments and housing 
prices, and thereby encouraged investors from all over the world to invest 
in the safe U.S. housing market. This in turn generated a vast supply of 
credit that inflated house prices and spurred a boom in residential 
construction. 19 
    
The low interest rates, long-term trend of rising housing prices, and 
easy initial terms of the adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) had encouraged 
borrowers to assume difficult mortgages in the belief they would be able to 
quickly refinance at more favorable terms. However, the underlying 
subprime mortgages were 80 percent adjustable-rate mortgages (Dodd, 
2007, February 7), and once interest rates began to rise and housing prices 
started to drop moderately in 2006 and 2007 in many parts of the U.S., 
refinancing became more difficult. Default and foreclosure activity increased 
dramatically as easy initial terms expired, home prices failed to increase as 
anticipated, and interest rates for ARMs were raised. Falling prices also 
resulted in homes that were worth less than the mortgage loan, and this 
provided a financial incentive to enter foreclosure. This situation was the 
main cause of the subprime mortgage crisis that started the first systemic 
financial failure in 2007. 
Krugman (2009, p. 148-151) has outlined reasons for this situation 
that indicate moral hazard (or in his terms, Ponzi schemes) as the cause for 
the subprime mortgage crisis: 
From long experience, we knew that home buyers shouldn’t take on 
mortgages whose payments they couldn’t afford, and that they 
should put enough money down so that they can sustain a 
moderate drop in home prices and still have positive equity. Low 
interest rates should have changed the mortgage payments 
associated with a given amount of borrowing, but not much else. 
What actually happened, was however a complete abandonment of 
traditional principles. To some extend this was driven by the 
irrational exuberance of individual families who saw house prices 
rising ever higher and decided that they should jump into the 
market, and not worry about how to make payments. But it was 
driven to a greater extend by a change in lending practices. Buyers 
were given loans requiring little or no down payment, and with 
monthly bills that were well beyond their ability to afford – or at 
least would be unaffordable once the initial low, teaser interest rate 
reset… 
Why did lenders relax their standards? First, they came to believe in 
ever-rising home prices. As long as home prices only go up, it 
doesn’t matter much from the lender’s point of view whether a 20 
    
borrower can make his or her payment: if the payment are too 
high, well, the buyer can either take out a home equity loan to get 
more cash or, if worst comes to worst, just sell the home and pay 
the mortgage. Second, the lender didn’t concern themselves with 
the quality of their loans because they didn’t hold on to them. 
Instead, they sold them to investors, who didn’t understand what 
they were buying. 
“Securitization” of home mortgages – assembling large pools of 
mortgages, then selling investors shares in the payment received 
from borrowers – isn’t a new practice. In fact, it was pioneered by 
Fannie Mae, the government-sponsored lending agency, which 
dates back to the 1930s. Until the great housing bubble, however, 
securitization was more or less completely limited to “prime” 
mortgages: loans to borrowers who could make a substantial down 
payment and had enough income to meet the mortgage payments… 
The financial innovation that made securitization of subprime 
mortgages possible was the collateralized debt obligations, or CDO. 
A CDO offered shares in the payments from a mortgage pool – but 
not all shares were created equal. Instead, some shares were 
“senior”, receiving first claim on the payments from mortgagees. 
Only once these claims were satisfied was money send to less 
senior shares. In principle, this was supposed to make the senior 
shares a very safe investment: even if some mortgages defaulted, 
how likely was it that enough would default to pose problems for 
the cash flow to these senior shares? (quite likely, it turned out – 
but that wasn’t understood at the time.) And so the rating agencies 
were willing to classify senior shares in CDOs as AAA, even if the 
underlying mortgages were highly dubious. This opened up large-
scale financing of subprime lending, because there are many 
institutional investors, such as pension funds, that won’t buy 
anything except AAA securities but were quite willing to buy AAA-
rated assets that yielded significant higher returns than ordinary 
bonds. 
As long as housing prices kept rising, everything looked fine and the 
Ponzi scheme kept rolling. 
 
This explanation has identified moral hazard, in that the executives of 
financial institutions responsible for originating loans (mortgages) to 
borrowers (homeowners) may have been motivated to relax their standards 21 
    
in conceding these loans. Traditionally, the mortgage model required a 
financial institution as the originating source for a loan to the borrower 
(homeowner), and this institution retained the credit (default) risk. With the 
advent of securitization, the traditional model gave way to the originate to 
distribute model, in which financial institutions essentially sell the 
mortgages and distribute credit risk to investors through mortgage-backed 
securities. Securitization meant that those issuing mortgages were no 
longer required to hold them to maturity. By selling the mortgages to 
investors, the originating financial institutions (that is, the institutions that 
issued the mortgages) recuperated their funds, enabling them to issue more 
mortgages and in doing so generate further transaction fees.  
This may have produced moral hazard, as the executives of financial 
institutions that issue mortgages and the mortgage brokers were 
increasingly motivated to focus on processing mortgage transactions for 
fees rather than on ensuring credit quality. If the homeowner (borrower) 
could not pay the mortgage, and was this was foreclosed, there was little 
impact for the issuer.  
McDonald & Robinson (2009, p. 185) have provided an illustrative 
account of moral hazard in their conversation with two mortgage salesmen 
from New Century. New Century was the second-largest subprime mortgage 
lender, and these salesmen had annual earnings between $300,000 and 
$600,000. Asked if they had considered the possibility of widespread default 
as a result of the onset of ARM resets, the answer of one of the salesmen 
was, “Not our concern, pal. Our job is to sell mortgage policy. Period. Right 
after that it’s someone else’s problem”. When asked whether proof or assets 
were needed before the mortgage in granted to a borrower, one answered, 
“Hell, no. They just need to state their income. No docs. That’s why we 
work here”. 
New Century filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code on August 2, 2007. On March 26, 2009, an 
unsealed report by the bankruptcy court examiner outlined a number of 
"significant improper and imprudent practices related to its loan 
originations, operations, accounting and financial reporting processes", and 22 
    
accused its auditor KPMG with helping the company to conceal the problems 
during 2005 and 2006 (New Century, Wikipedia, retrieved September 7, 
2009). 
 
Moral hazard and speculation 
Speculation is characterized by a rapid increase in the quantity of debt, 
and an equally rapid decrease in its quality (Bellamy & Magdoff, 2009, p. 
96-97). Heavy borrowing is used to purchase financial assets, and is not 
based on the income streams that they will generate, but on the 
assumption of increasing prices for these assets. This is what economist 
Minsky (1982, p. 28-29) has called Ponzi finance or hyper-speculation. 
CDOs with exposure to subprime mortgages were the perfect object for this 
type of speculation. 
The speculation frenzy that caused the housing bubble was 
generalized; starting from subprime borrowers, mortgage lenders and 
brokers, it spread to housing developers and real estate speculators. Even 
homeowners saw the increase in value of their homes as natural and 
permanent, and took advantage of low interest rates to refinance and 
withdraw cash value from their homes to increase consumption. The 
puzzling question is why so many financial institutions took such a large 
gamble on real estate, thereby placing themselves and the whole financial 
system at risk. By holding such large amounts of the AAA-rated subprime 
backed CDOs, these firms added very risky options to the housing market. 
Jaffee et al. (2009, p. 73-74) have presented their conclusions as to 
why financial institutions engaged in such risky ventures: 
We present three possible explanations for why financial firms 
took the gamble. The first possibility is that there was poor 
governance within financial firms. The creation of structured 
product groups, and their meteoric success through the 
combination of fees and continued premiums from retaining 
these products, gave these groups a free hand to take big 
asymmetric bets. The second possibility is that, because many 
of the firms had an explicit guarantee on their short-term debt 
(i.e., deposit insurance) and an implicit guarantee from being 23 
  
to big to fail, their funding cost for these types of risky 
investments were lower than they would have otherwise been. 
Thus, the AAA-rated security was the most attractive 
investment opportunity given (1) their capital and risk 
constrains and (2) artificially cheap funding sources. The third 
possibility is that the financial firms did not fully understand 
the nature of the loans they were securitizing because (1) they 
didn’t fully appreciate how securitization had eroded loan 
quality, and (2) a lack of transparency about the quality of the 
loans meant they did not realize their mistake. Consequently, 
when housing prices started dropping, these institutions did 
not realize that the value of their MBS positions was declining 
dramatically and so did not unwind their positions in a timely 
fashion before the losses got to big. 
 
They have explained further that the type of securitization used for the 
subprime mortgages made the crisis much worse than it would have been, 
even with the failures of the financial institutions in September of 2008. The 
complex performance of the securitization provided such little transparency 
with the securitized products that the effect of the crisis was substantially 
amplified. To trace the workings of this complexity, they have outlined how 
subprime mortgage loans work their way through the structuring process 
(see Figure 2): 
 
Figure 2. The securitization process of subprime mortgage loans 
 
Source: Adapted from Acharya & Richardson (2009, p. 74) 
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A portfolio of subprime mortgages is pooled into a residential 
mortgage-backed security (RMBS). The RMBS has five tranches; the priority 
of the tranches is based on seniority in terms of allocating default losses, 
ranging from the most protected tranches (AAA) down to the least 
protected on (BBB). At each point in the structure, the rating agency would 
determine the rating based on its assessment of each loan’s default 
probability and, in theory, the correlation across defaults. Note that the top 
96 percent of the cash flows go to a high grade CDO, which again is broken 
into six classes, the top 60 percent of which is the senior AAA tranche. The 
game was to try to generate as many AAA-rated securities as possible. In 
this example, the original fraction of AAA-rated securities in the RMBS was 
81 percent, while at the end of the securitization process, it was 91.93 
percent. Knowing that there is now a significant probability of widespread 
defaults, the question is whether the market can price or understand the 
senior and junior tranches of the AAA CDO. 
In the heat of this financial crisis, it is difficult for financial markets to 
operate if there is a lack of transparency. This is due to (1) agents not being 
able to price these complex CDOs and (2) uncertainty about who is holding 
them. Without being able to assess the solvency of the financial firms within 
the system, there is a complete lack of trust and confidence in 
counterparties, a spike in the overall level of risk aversion, and market wide 
freezes without any source of liquidity. 
The securitization process described and illustrated here seems to have 
been conceived to fool investors into believing that they were investing in 
AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities. Because of the lack of transparency 
in these securities, investors seem to have trusted the rating agencies and 
the salesmen of the financial institutions. Considering that the executives of 
the financial institutions that created these CDOs (such as the examples in 
Figure 2) received millions of dollars in bonuses for their creation, without 
any consequence to them if these failed, this strongly indicates a moral 
hazard that was motivated by these bonuses. The rating agencies that 
qualified the AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities probably did so to 25 
    
oblige their clients (the financial institutions that that conceived these 
securities), motivated by the fees they charged these clients, and they will 




As shown above, many of the authors and editors of the reputable 
magazine The Economist, mentioned in this paper attribute the systemic 
financial failures that occurred in the U.S. in August 2007 (the subprime 
mortgage crisis) and in September 2008 (the shadow-banking crisis) to 
moral hazard. Certainly all the circumstantial evidence and the 
extraordinary bonuses paid to the executives responsible for the financial 
institutions seems to indicate that this is correct. Unfortunately however, 
there is no academic research providing proof that this is indeed the case. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that these executives were at least were 
irresponsible in terms of their risky speculations, that they failed in their 
responsibility toward shareholders, and that they provided unsound 
guidance to the investors who trusted them. There is also no doubt that the 
boards of these institutions failed in their fiduciary duty toward the 
shareholders. For this reason, this paper can conclude that the executives of 
the financial institutions made excessively risky bets that were possibly, but 
not certainly, motivated by moral hazard. 
A proper epilogue regarding the responsibility for the financial crisis of 
2007-9 has been written by Clementi et al. (2009, p. 73-74): 
So far, senior management and boards of shipwrecked U.S. 
financial firms have not publicly accepted responsibility for the 
disasters on their watch, almost uniformly holding “unpredictable 
market turmoil” responsible. Perhaps it’s the American tendency to 
blame the other guy when something bad happens. Perhaps it’s the 
fear of accountability in a highly litigious society. Who knows? 
Contrition is not part of the vocabulary. In contrast, Swiss former 
senior managers of UBS recently acknowledged that they were in 
fact on the bridge of the ship and have repaid or forgone some $35 
million in compensation accrued during the time the bank struck the 
iceberg. Perhaps in contrast to small countries like Switzerland, with 26 
    
powerful social mores and long memories, disgraced U.S. senior 
managers and board members can count on the camouflage of an 
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